Draft systems in professional team sports and the restraint of trade doctrine: is the AFL draft distinguishable from the NSWRL draft? by Davies, Chris
80 Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Journal 2006 1(1) 
DRAFT SYSTEMS IN PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 
AND THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE DOCTRINE: IS THE AFL 
DRAFT DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE NSWRL DRAFT? 
Chris Davies * 
When the New South Wales Rugby League ("NSWRL ") implemented a draft 
system in 1990 it was successfully challenged by the players in Adamson v 
NSWRL. This article examines this decision, though it should be noted that the 
rules of the NSWRL draft are no longer in operation. The A ustralian Football 
League ("AFL 'J, however, has continued to use ils draft system and it is argued 
that the AFL draft rules are much fairer on the players than the rules previously 
used by the NSWRL. This is because while the AFL draft does initially restrict a 
player's choice of employer, this is only true for the first two years. At the end of 
that period the rules provide players with some genuine bargaining power to heIp 
them choose the employer of their choice. it is suggested therefore {hat the AFL 
draft is distinguishable from the draft system once used by the NSWRL that was 
declared invalid by the courts. There are still problems with the AFL draft in that 
clubs are able to initiate the trade of players without the player's consent, but it is 
suggested that this can be solved by the introduction of a consent clause. Il is also 
suggested that the restrictive nature of the draft can be reduced by the 
introduction of a limited fonn of free agency for players who have been playing 
for a certain period of lime and/or played a certain number of games. 
Introduction 
Labour market controls have been implemented by the organizing bodies of team 
sports since the formation of professional leagues in the nineteenth century. In 
Australia, the Victorian Football League (VFL), now the Australian Football 
League (AFL), as well as the fonner controlling body of rugby league's main 
competition, the New South Wales Rugby League (NSWRL), have, over the 
decades, implemented various controls to limit the movement of players from one 
club to another. These have included metropolitan and country zoning, whlch was 
declared a restraint of trade in Foschini v Victorian Football League and South 
Melbourne Football Club/ a limit of 13 imports for each club that was used in the 
1970's by the NSWRL; and a retain and transfer system where a club could place a 
player on a retain list, thus preventing him from playing for another club without 
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the consent of his existing club. The retain and transfer system, however, was also 
beld to be a restraint of trade in Buckley v Tutty.2 
More recently draft systems have been implemented by both the VFL, in 1986, and 
the NS\VRL, in 1990. While the draft system introduced by the VFL continues to 
be used in the AFL, the draft rules used by the NSWRL were held by the Full 
Court of the Federal Court to represent an unreasonable restraint of trade in 
Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd ("Adamson '),3 and are therefore 
no longer in operation. This article wlll examine this decision and also the United 
States case of Smith v Pro Football Inc, ("Smith,,)4 in the context of whether these 
decided court cases indicate tbat all draft systems, including the AFL' s, represent 
an unreasonable restraint of trade, or whether each set of draft rules needs to be 
treated as a distinct entity. Case examples w11l then be examined to see what the 
rules of the AFL draft system allow in regard to the movement of players between 
clubs. First, however, a brief explanation will be made of what is involved with a 
draft system 
Draft Systems 
Draft systems come in two fonus. One is used to control the entry of players into a 
competition and is commonly referred to as external draft, while the other is used 
to control the movement of players already playing in the competition, and is 
usually referred to as an internal draft. All draft systems are based on the general 
principle that the last placed team will have first choice of the avaj}able players, 
with the Test of the teams then having a choice in the reverse order from which 
they finished the previous season's competition, with the process then being 
repeated for a second round, third round etc. 5 
The system was devised by the National Football League (NFL) in 1935 6 and it 
has continued to employ an external draft ever since. It was the NFL draft system 
on which the then VFL modeled its own system when it introduced a national draft 
in 1986, with an internal pre-season draft also being introduced for players already 
playing in the competltioD in 1988. As Dabscheck and Opie point out, this internal 
'(1970) 125 CLR 3. A similar system in English soccer was held to be an unreasonable restraint of trade in Eastham 
"Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] 1 Ch 413. 
3 (Appeals Case) (199l) 31 FeR 242. 
4 593 F 2d 1173 (1978). 
$ The AFL draft has also included systems of priority picks where a club that has won five matches or less in a 
season, or at other times, less than ten games over two seasons, was then eligible for a draft choice before the first 
round. This however led to speculation that it gave teams the incentive to lose matches at the end of a season in 
order to keep the number of wins under these requirements. For lhe 2006 season therefore the system is to be 
changed so that the extra draft choice comes after the first round has been completed, that is, at number 17. 
6 Smith "Pro Football Inc593 F 2d 1173 (1978), 1175. 
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sty Ie draft is an uniquely Australian fonn of labour market controL 7 Under the 
draft rules, all players from outside of the competition have to nominate 
themselves for the national (external) draft, with these players then being selected 
by the clubs in the reverse order that they finished the previous season, though 
clubs can also choose to trade draft choices for players already playing for another 
club. Once a player was drafted a club initially had a hold on his services for three 
years, 8 though this was then changed to one year, before being changed again to 
the present two years in 1994. Players already playing in the AFL who have been 
delisted by their clubs can also nominate for the na60nal draft, but players whose 
contracts have been completed and who wish to leave their club, but have not been 
delisted, can only nominate for the later pre-season (internal) draft. However, these 
now uncontracted players who wish to leave a club can be traded by that club for 
other players andlor draft choices in the national draft. 
When the NSWRL implemented a draft system in 1990, it too included both an 
external and internal draft, The draft operated under a munbcr of rules set down by 
the NSWRL. Undcr rule 55 a list known as the Internal Draft List was to be 
circulated to each club on the fIrst Wednesday of November. Rule 56, meanwhile, 
entitled a player who partidpated in the Internal Draft meeting to either negotiate 
and entcr into a contract with any club, or enter into a subsequent Internal Draft 
List 
Rule 57 entitled a player who did not wish to play for the club which had selected 
him in the draft to make an appeal to an Appeals Board. Rule 61 then directed the 
board to have regard to: 
L The best interests ofllie game, the player and the club. 
2. Any unreasonable fmaneiaI or other hardship caused. 
3. The service the player in question had given to the game. 
Under rule 64 a player who had successfully appealed was entitled to participate in 
the next Internal Draft Meeting. 9 It was these rules in regard to the internal draft 
that were the subject of litigation in Adamson. 
7 Braham Dabscheck and Hayden Opie, 'Labour Regulation of Sporting Labonr Markets' (2003) 16 Auslro/ian 
Journal a/Labour Law 259-283,265. 
8 Braham Dabscheck, 'Abolishing Transfer Fees: The Victorian Football League's New Employment Rules', (J 989) 
6 Sporting Traditions 63-87, 71. 
9 Adamson and Others v New Soulh Wales Rugby League Ltd and Of hers (Trial Case) (1990) 27 FCR 535. 538-40. 
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Draft Systems and the Restraint of Trade Doctrine 
The Norden/elt Test 
The common law restraint of trade doctrine was established in Norden/ell v Maxim 
Norden/ell Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd,!O a case involving a restrictive clause in 
a contract that prevented the seller of a business from operating a new business in 
that particular industry for a period of 25 years, The test that was developed in 
Norden/elt was that contracts preventing a person from canying out their trade, 
business, occupation or profession will be in restraint of trade, unless it is 
reasonably necessarily to protect the legitimate interests of the party imposing the 
restraint, not unreasonable in regard to the party on whom the restraint is imposed, 
and not injurious to the public,ll Thus in regard to draft systems, the restraint must 
first be what is reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate objectives of the 
league, namely the creation of more even, and financially more viable competition, 
It must then not be unreasonable on the players, and thirdly not be injurious to the 
public who watch the games. 
Adamson v NSWRL 
The first argument in Adamson was that the internal draft introduced by the 
NSWRL breached s45 (2) (a) and (b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) 
as either representing an exclusionary provision or one which had the purpose or 
effect of substantially lessoning competition. Hill J, however, held that the 
restrictions imposed by the draft rules did not come within the ambit of either s45 
(2) (a) or (b) of the TPA because the relevant playing contracts involved contracts 
of service. 12 The second argument involved s88F of the Industrial Arbitration Act 
w [1894] AC 535. 
1l Ibid 565. For a discussion of NordenJeft io regard to the other labour market controls utilised by the AFL, namely 
the salary cap, see Antoni Buti, 'Salary caps in Professional Teams Sports: an Umeasonable Restraint of Trade'. 
(1999) 14 Journalo/Contract Law 130-153, 133-4. 
12 Ibid 548-9. Sce Warrcn Pengillcy, 'Sporting Drafts and Restraint of Trade' (J994) ]0 Queensland University of 
Technology Law JOllmal89, 11O-1l2 and 116-7 where thc author argues that the Trade Practices Act 1974 (CIb) 
should apply to labour market controls, such as player drafts. Section 45 of the TP A, it should be noted, was 
successfully argued in the Super Leah'Ue case: News Lid v Allstralian Rugby Foo/ball League (1996) 139 ALR 193, 
while South Sydney was successful, at least in the Full Court of the Federal Court, in South Sydney District Rugby 
League Football Club Ltd v News Ltd POOl] ATPR 4J-824, FOT a discussion ofthesc cases and how s45 applies to a 
sporting context see Warren Pengilley 'Rugby League at Trial', (1996) II Australian and New Zealand Trade 
Practices 113-124; C. Swceney 'Professional Sporting Leagues and the Competition Laws', (1997) 4 Competition 
and Consumer Law Journal 173-202; Lyndon Griggs 'News Ltd v ARL: the Birthplace of Snpcrleague But thc 
Death of Joint Ventures?' (1997) 5 Competition and Consumer Law Journal ] 66-179; , Chris Davies • Souths v 
News Ltd, (2001) 8 James Cook University Law Review 121-129; Saul Fridman, 'Sport and the Law: The South 
Sydney Appeal', (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 558-68; Chris Davies 'News Limited y South Sydney District 
Rugby League Club Limited', (2003) 10 James Cook University Law Review 116-128. 11lis section bas therefore 
been successfully argued by a sporting organisation and a club, as both me able to use s45 of the TP A. However, 
given the fact that any challenge to the AFL draft is almost certainly going to come from the players, the law as it 
presently stands means that 545 would not be able to be utilised. The salary cap on the other hand could be a 
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1940 (NSW) which allowed the Industrial Commission to make orders declaring 
void in whole, or in part, either ab initio or from some other time, any contract or 
arrangement which is either (i) unfair, (ii) harsh or unconscionable, or (iii) is 
against public interest Justice Hill, however, noted that the fairness used by the 
section involved consideration of all the circumstances of each player, and since a 
substantial number of the applicants did not give evidence, his Honour concluded 
that it was impossible to properly evaluate the issues of faimess. 13 This only left 
the players with the argument iliat the rules were in breach of the common law 
restraint of trade doctrine. 
In regard to the restraint of trade claim, Hill J pointed out that the rules relating to 
the internal draft could operate as a restraint by preventing a player from playing 
with the club of his choice. It differed, therefore, from the Buckley v Tutty case 
where the restraint operated to prevent the player from exercising his trade 
altogether. Despite this, it was still Hill 1's opinion that: 
"short of restraining a player from playing altogether there could seldom be a 
greater restraint upon trade than restricting an employee's freedom from 
h . h' I ,,14 C ooslng lS emp oyer. 
In applying the Nordenfelt test Justice Hjl1 identified three relevant legitimate 
interests of the League and the clubs the internal draft was concerned with 
protecting. These were: 
1. The desirability of a strong and competitive competition, with teams as 
evenly matched as possible. 
2. All the clubs competing to be as financially viable as possible. 
different situation as a club, the Sydney Roosters, has threatened 10 challenge the NRL salary cap. One advantage of 
using s45 of the TPA is that authorisation can be sought for a provision that may be invalid under the act. In 
Australia, s88 of the TP A allows authorisiaton to be sought from the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC), on the grounds that it is in the public interest and that the benefits outweigh the anti-
competitive detriment, while in New Zealand s58 of the Commerce ActJ986 (NZ) has similar provisions. This 
section was successful used by the New Ze~land Rugby Union in Rugby Union Players Association inc v Commerce 
Commission (J 996] 3 NZLR 301 in relation 10 a transfer system that created a quota on the number of players in a 
given cntegory that could transfer to a new team. For a discussion of this case and the argJ.lment that s88 could have 
been used in A mtrai ia in both the Super League case and in regard to the situation in yolving South Sydney see 
Chris Davies 'News LId v ARL, South Sydney v News Ltd - and the Question of Authorisation Under 588 of as the 
Trade Practices Act', (2002) 10 Trade Practices Law Journal 215-225. It should be further noted that the standard 
player contracts used in the AFL and NFl, and also rugby union in Australia and New Zealand, mean that the 
players are clearly employees, though the courts had declared the players 10 be employees well before the 
introduction of these standard contracts: see Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353, 372; Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v Maddelena (1971) 2 ATR 541,549. 
B Ibid 552.3. 
141bid 555. 
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3. That the clubs be in a position to retain the players engaged by them and that 
in particular ricb clubs should not be able to plunder the weaker clubs of 
their good players. 15 
When looking at the question as to the protection of the legitimate interests of the 
League, Hill J accepted the fact that a desirable objective at the beginning of the 
season was for teams to be as evenly matched for talent as possible. His Honour 
further noted the inevitable fact that the assessment of equality of talent in teams 
was very much a subjective one, but nevertheless concluded that the internal draft 
did, to some degree, operate to assist in the furtherance of these aims. 16 His 
Honour also noted that one of the consequences of the draft was that clubs could 
not approach players with offers of high rewards as they knew they could not 
secure the services of tbat player. Thus, to some degree the internal draft did 
militate against the consequences of full blown cheque book warfare. I? As to the 
fact that the draft helped to prevent clubs from poaching players mid season, it was 
also held to be reasonable for the League to seek to outlaw unrestricted mid-season 
offers that would lead to the loss of the top level playing talent of a club. IS 
In looking at how the internal draft: affected the interests of the players, Hill J Doted 
that the applicants emphasised four matters: 
J. The importance that a particular player may place on obtaining a job which 
might provide training for a future career. 
2. The problem that a player could be drafted by a club with whom the player 
did not wish to play. 19 
3. Since the methods ofremuneration varied, and as win bonuses depended on 
team success, the actual remuneration receivable by the player could vary 
depending upon the team which drafted him. 
4. The late November timing of the draft imposed a very significant detriment 
to a player since clubs often started training in early October. 20 
Hill J pointed out in regard to these points that the rules did not prevent a player 
from stipUlating that a particular type of job be found for him, and that in practical 
terms, a club would not draft a player who clearly did not wish to play with them. 
15 Ibid 560. 
16 Ibid 56l-2. 
17 Ibid 565. 
18 Ibid 566. 
19 Ibid 557. 
20 Ibid 558.9. 
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Any detriment to the players, such as the fact that the remuneration may vary 
depending on the club to which the player was drafted to, needed to be weighed 
against the legitimate interests of the League. 2] Justice Hill then held that the 
restraint imposed by the internal draft was not unreasonable having regard to, 011 
one hand, the legitimate interests of the League and the clubs, and on the other, the 
interests of the players. 22 
On appeal to the Full Court of tbe Federal Court both 545 (2) (a) and (b) of the 
TPA and s88F Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (NSW) were again argued 
tillsuccessfully by the applicants. In regard to the common law restraint of trade 
Sheppard J noted that in certain circumstances the internal rules did operate to the 
substantial economic disadvantage of the players, and while he acknowledged the 
clubs and admimstrators were acting in good faith and had the best interests of the 
game in mind, it was his opinion that this did not warrant the conclusion that there 
was no unreasonable restraint of trade. 23 Wilcox J was of the opinion that the fact 
that the players were inhibited from looking elsewhere meant that their bargaining 
position with their existing club was weakened, and that it was common experience 
that such a weakened bargaining position leads to diminished rewards. 24 
It was also Wilcox 1's opinion that the internal draft rules did very little to protect 
the interests of the League and the clubs, yet at the same time djd much to infringe 
the interests of the players. This was because they firstly limited the players' 
choice of employer, and secondly that the rules operated after the expiration of 
their contracts,25 a point, it iswortb noting, that was a major reason soccer's 
transfer system was deemed to be invalid in ASBL v Bosman ("Bosman"). 26 
Likewise in Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd 27 Wilbelforce J (as 
his Lordship then was) emphasised tbat the English soccer retain and transfer rules 
operated at a time when the player was not an employee of the club, with the retain 
rules being held to be an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
Gummow J noted that the basic proposition that the reasonableness of a restraint of 
trade was to be tested against what the restraint entitles or requires the parties to 
do. The issue of reasonableness of the restraint was, therefore, not to be determined 
by what happened in practice, or might happen in practice, but by what was 
permitted by the League and the clubs under the terms of the rules agreed between 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid 568. 
1) Adamson and Others v Ne.v South Wales Rugby League Ltd and Others (Appeal Case) (1991) 31 FeR 242, 248" 
24 Ibid 280. 
23 lbid 280. 
26 Union Royale des Societes de Football Association (ASSL) v Bosman [1996J 1 C.M.L.R 64S. 
27 [\964] 1 Ch 413, 431. 
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them. 28 His Honour identified the same three legitimate interests previously 
identified by Hill ] and in regard to the provision of an even competition, be held 
that the NSWRL had not satisfied the onus of showing the restraint of the internal 
draft was no more than what was reasonable. 29 
In regard to the objective of financial stability, Gummow J agreed with Wilcox J 
that there was no evidence of any problems as to the financial stability in a system 
that imposed salary caps without an internal draft 30 As to the aim ofhc1ping retain 
their present players, his Honour stated that perhaps the best way of achieving this 
was to place the players on long tcnn contracts. 31 While Gummow 1's overall 
conclusion was that the internal draft was in restraint of trade, his Honour did add 
that the NSWRL could reconsider the rules, implying that different, less restrictive 
draft rules could be considered a reasonable restraint of trade. 32 In his judgment 
Gummow J also referred to Smith, a case involving a challenge to the NFL's draft 
system. Since the external draft is yet to be judicially considered in Australia this 
case provides useful material in regard to an external draft. 
Smith v Pro Football Inc 
The first thing that should be noted about Smith is that, unllke Adamson, it did not 
involve a collective challenge to the system, but was an indirect way for a player to 
receive compensation for a career ending injury.33 The player in question, Smith, 
had been drafted by the Washington Redskins in 1967 and suffered his injury the 
following year. He contended that the draft, as is existed at that time, was an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, was in violation of the Sherman Antitrust 
legislation, and that, but for the draft, he would have negotiated a far more 
lucrative contract than the one he signed. 34 
The majority noted that the NFL clubs were not competitive in any economic sense 
as the clubs basically operate as a joint venture in producing an entertainment 
product, namely football games and telecasts, with the draft being designed not to 
insulate the NFL from competition, but to improve the entertainment product by 
enhancing its teams' competitive quality.35 It was also noted that the asserted 
justification for the draft was that it had the legitimate business purpose of 
28 AdamsQn and a/hers v New South Wules Rugby League L/d and Olhers (Appeal Case) (199]) 31 FeR 242, 285. 
2~ lbid 296. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 297 
32 Ibid 297. For further discussion on the case see A. Humphries 'Sport, Restraint of Trade and the AU5trdiian 
Sourts: Adamson y New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1993) 15 Sydney Law Review 259-283 . 
. Smi/h v Pro Foo/balllnc 593 F 2d 1173 (1978),1192. 
34 Ibid 1174-75. 
JS Ibid 1179. 
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promoting competitive and playing equality amongst the teams, producing better 
entertainment for the public, higher salaries for the players, and increased security 
for the clubs. However, it was held by the majority that the draft was 
anticompetitive in its effect on the market for players' services because it virtually 
eliminated economic competition amongst buyers for the services of sellers by 
permitting college players to negotiate with only one team. 36 It was also held that 
the draft did not increase competition in the economic sense of encouraging others 
to enter the market and to offer the product at a lower cost. 37 Thus the Court 
concluded that the draft, as it existed in 1968, was an unreasonable restraint of 
trade as it was anticompetitive in its purpose and severely anticompetitive in its 
effect. 38 The majority also expressed the opinion that it was the sharing of revenue 
by the NRL that had created the equality amongst the teams in the league, not the 
draft system. 39 
Another feature of the case was the strong dissenting judgment of MacKinnon J 
who noted that the system was a pure draft- simple, uncomplicated, and complete 
with the team with the poorest winning record drafting first and the others 
following in the reverse order to their win-lost record. His Honour also noted that 
since its inception in 1935 approximately 17,000 players had been drafted by 
professional football teams with a relatively insignificant number of lawsuits 
challenging the validity of the NFL draft. MacKinnon J was also of the opinion 
that a player draft is natural for league sports because competitive equality among 
the component teams is an inherent requirement for meaningful sports competition. 
His Honour gave the example of the Cleveland Browns in the All-American 
.Football Conference, which, in the process ofwlnning championships nearly every 
year, saw its crowds drop from 70,000 to less than 20,000 because the fans said 
HOh they are going to win anyway, what is the use of going out there".40 
Arguably, therefore, sporting equality is just as important to the top teams as it is to 
the bottom teams. His Honour also expressed the opinion that while revenue was 
equally shared amongst the various teams in the NFL, this of itself would not 
overcome the innate advantages that some teams would have because of the city 
they were based in, or the perception that certain teams had a better prospect of 
winning a championship. Only a draft system, his Honour stated, could do that 41 
Justice MacKinnon also expressed the opinion that it was the players who were a 
direct recipient of the benefits of the increased national interest in the game. It was 
noted that the increased benefits available as a professional player had all but 
36 Ibid 1186.87. 
)7 Ibid 1186. 
1. Ibid. 
19 Ibid 1188, 1184. 
'" Ibid 1197·98. 
') Ibid 12m. 
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eliminated the competition for graduating college players from lucrative coaching 
positions and other business opportunities which at one time had meant that many 
of the best college players did not go on into the professional ranks. Once the best 
college players regularly joined the professional ranks it was his Honour's opinion 
that the quality of the game was assured, with it being his opinion that the growth 
of football between 1935 and 1968 was due largely to the competitive balance 
achieved by the League during those years. 42 
His Honour also made it clear that be disagreed with the majority's view that the 
effect of the draft was to strip the players of any real bargaining power, lowered 
their salaries, and that it suppressed, if not destroyed, competition for their 
salaries.43 In his Honour's opinion the majority had only looked at the draft from a 
players' perspective and had not taken into consideration that, in regard to 
bargaining power, the operation of the draft also restricts the clubs from dealing 
with other players. It was pointed out, for instance, that the Washington Redskins 
had drafted Smith because of their need for a free safety position, but in selecting 
Smith the Redskins had to overlook other players of similar ability as it could not 
waste a later round choice on another player from this position. 44 
MacKiI1I1on J then stated that without a draft a less stable league with fewer 
franchises and lower salaries would result. With a draft system the incoming 
players received salaries and bonuses far in excess of what they could command in 
a free market of teams, in a league that did not have the competitive balance that a 
player draft produces.45 His Honour stated that the aim of a league is to have all 
teams as nearly as possible at roughly equal competitive strength and drawing 
power, and not to create problem franchises, and that a draft system is one of the 
more important methods by which weaker teams can improve themselves.46 
Analysis of the Cases 
Adamson and Smith provide judicial opinion in regard to both the internal and 
external draft systems. The author agrees that the rules in regards to the NSWRL 
draft that were examined in Adamson were rightfully considered to be an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. This was because although there were two drafts, a 
player who had already played in the competition was only able to change clubs 
via the second, internal draft. The practical effect of this meant that there were two 
totally independent drafts which gave players already in the competition little or no 
,2 Ibid 1200-0 L 
<3 Ibid 121l. 
«Ibid 1212. 
's Ibid 1214. 
4<; Ibid 1216. 
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bargaining power in relationship to what club would now select them, and certainly 
no more power than when they first entered into the competition. There is, 
however, an interaction between the two drafts in the AFL, with the ability of a 
player to nominate for the pre-season (internal) draft if his club has not negotiated 
a trade deal, giving that player significant bargaining power. This, therefore, is an 
important difference between the NSWRL draft and the AFL draft. 
The internal draft system also involved many 'draft meetings', held over a period 
of months, at which players could be selected by the clubs. This, in the author's 
opinion, was unnecessarily complicated and unfair on the players as it made it 
harder for them to know which club they would be playing for, and did not provide 
them with sufficient time to train with the team before the start of the new season. 
The AFL draft involving just the one external draft and one internal draft is a much 
simpler and much fairer system on the players, and represents another significant 
difference between the NSWRL draft and the AFL draft. 
In regard to the decision in Smith, whlle the majority decided that the draft system 
was invalid, they also stated that this only appbed to the rules as they stood in 
1968, and it was acknowledged that by the time the case was heard in 1978, 
significant changes had been made to the NFL draft. This js similar to what Justice 
Gummow stated in Adamson, namely that the NSWRL could look at redrafting 
their rules, implying that a different set of rules could be considered reasonable. 
Thus there is authority in the decided cases that each set of draft rules has to be 
judged on its own merits. The anthor would therefore propose that while, prima 
facie, Adamson acts as a precedent in Australia that draft systems are an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, because each set of draft nlles needs to be 
examined individually only those identical or very similar to the NSWRL draft 
rules would definitely fall under the precedent set by Adamson. It is also suggested 
that Adamson emphasises the need to examine what is permitted under the rules 
which involves looking at the practical operation of the specific rules of a 
particular draft system. Therefore, what is pennitted under the AFL draft rules will 
now be examined in relation to, firstly, the protection of the interests ofthe league, 
then in regard to the third element of Norden/elt, namely whether it is injurious to 
the public. Finally, its impact on the players will be examined. 47 
41 The author acknowledges that the strict interpretation QftlJeNordenfelt test requires that the interests of the parties 
be examined, and jf that is reasonable, then the impact on the public needs to be examined. However, for the 
stttlcture of this article it was better to look at the impact on the public before looking at the draft's impact on the 
players. 
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The AFL Draft and the Restraint of Trade Doctrine 
Protecting the Interests of the League 
The restraint of trade doctrine places the onus on the party imposing the restriction 
to show that it is no more than what is necessary to protect their interests. 48 As 
with all labour market controls, a league such as the AFL justifies the imposition of 
a draft system by stating that it helps to create a more even, and therefore a 
fmancial1y more viable, competition. As Buti points out,49 the administrators of 
professional sporting leagues and clubs often seek to justify labour and product 
market controls on the basis of the peculiar economics of the sports industry. That 
is why professional team sports have a tendency to be highly regulated and co-
operative organisations with rules and restrictive labour market controls that have 
to be obeyed by both the clubs and the players. The reason for this is that the 
attractiveness of the competition is arguably dependent on a high degree of 
uncertainty about the result, and so measures are needed to reduce the chances of a 
few teams dominating the competition by means of their superior economic 
power. 50 A question then arises as to whether a draft system actually helps to 
create a more even competition, with the author's opinion being that the AFL lS 
now an eveD competition. 5 I This conclusion is reached by comparing the evenness 
of each decade that the VFLI AFL has been in existence, with this comparison 
being based on three criteria. These are the number of teams winning premierships 
in each decade, the number of teams making the fmals at least once every decade, 
and the number of teams fulfilling their "finals quota".52 A brief overview of the 
author's results are as follows: the 1990's saw seven clubs win the premiership 
compared to a combined total of five clubs during the 1970's and 1980's; every 
club, except Fremantle who only joined the AFL in 1995, maq,e the finals at least 
once in the 1990's, the first time this had happened since the 1920's; and most 
4~ Buti, above nll, 141- This therefore raises the concept of prOlcctable interests which lies at the heart of the 
justification of the restraint of trade doctrine: see John Carter and David Harland, Contract Law in Australia, 4!h 
Edition, Butterworths, Sydney, 2002, 588. For a discussion of protectablc interests in sporting leagues and the 
salary cap see Chris Davies, 'The Use of Salary Cap in Professional Team Sports and the Restraint of Trade 
Doctrine, (2006) 22 Journal of Contract Law. 
49 Ibid 142 
50 Ibid: 143: 
5J The author does acknowledge that there is always an element of subjectivity to this. Note too that in Adamson and 
Others v New Smllh Wales Rugby League (Trial Case) (1990) 27 FeR 535,562-3 it was held that statistics cannot be 
used to try and detennine the evenness of a competition because of the fact that there has not been sufficient time to 
create a valid sample si7.e for statistical analysis. 
5' The finals quota involves looking at the number of times a club makes the finals in a given decade in relation to 
the percentage ofteams that make the finals each year. For example, in lhe AFL eight teams out of sixteen (fifty per 
cent) now make the finals each year. This means that the finals quota is now fifty per cent, that is, in a perfectly even 
competition each team would be expected to make the finals fifty per cent of the time which is five times per 
decade. 
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clubs in the 1990's went close to reaching their finals quota. 53 In the present 2000 
decade there has already been five different premiers, while all the clubs have 
already made the finals at least once. 
As noted by Le Grand,54 there is also strong anecdotal evidence that in the AFL 
there has never been smaller gap between tbe best and the worse teams in the 
competition. 55 Three AFL coaches, Essendon's Kevin Sheedy, Sydney's Paul Roos 
and the Western Bulldogs' Rodney Eade, for instance, have all made statements in 
recent years about how even the AFL competition nowis,56 with Eade pointing out 
that the evenness of the 2005 season was almost inevitable considering that all but 
23 players now in the competition have entered it by means of the national draft. 57 
It is suggested that the labour controls imposed by the AFL, of which the draft is 
arguably the most significant, is the reason behind this. Therefore, it can be argued 
that the AFL can justify the use of the draft system because it, together with the 
AFL's use of a salary cap, has helped the league to achieve its stated objective of a 
more even and financially more viable competition. Its flllancial viability can be 
seen by the recent $780m five year television deal that the AFL bas just negotiated. 
In regard to the AFL's use of the twin system of a draft and salary cap, it is the 
author's view that it is the draft system that is instrumental in ensuring that the 
playing strength is initially evenly spread, with the salary cap then playing an 
important role in the helping to ensure that this evenness is maintained. 58 
The Interests of the Public 
Another component of the Nordenfelt test is whether the contract or regulations are 
injurious to the public. It is suggested that what the public have gained from the 
introduction of the draft are the following: 
$3 This is a ~ummary of the findings in another article by the author entitled 'The AFL's Holy Grail: the Quest for an 
Even Competition' (2005) 12 James Cook University Law Review. For discussions on how the evenness of sporting 
leagues may be measured see: Joshua Uti and Rodney Fort, 'Pitfalls to Measuring Competitive Balance with Gini 
Coefficients', (2002) 3 Journal of Sports Economics 367; Jeffrey Boreland and Robert MacDonald, 'The Demands 
for Spor!', (2003) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 478; P.Dorian Owen and Clayton R. Weatherston, 
'Uncertaintly of Outcome and Super 12 Rugby Union Attendance' (2004) 5 Journal of Sports Ecomonics 347. 
54 Chip Le Gnmd, 'Interstate clubs hold all the vital aces,' The Australian, Thursday. 5 June, 2003, 16. 
55 Chip Le Grand, "Sydney pours SlOOm into AFL', The Australian, Thursday, 5 June, 2003, 16. 
56 See Jessica Halloran, 'Hayes enjoying club culture', The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 J July, 2003, 38. 
57 For a list of the 23 players see Michael Lovett, AFL Record Guide fO Season 2005, Australian Football Leaguc, 
2005,335. These players entered the competition through a number of zone exemptions that allowed clubs to select 
a pJayer or players from their lncal zone, or in the case of Sydney and Brisbane, from their state zones, with these 
choices being made prior to the national draft. There are also a few playcrs from Adelaide and Fremantlc still 
pJaying Who were also selected as pre-draft selections from the time when these new teams in the competition were 
entitl ed to such selections. Considering that the most recent player selected under these systems was Brisbane's 
CJark Keating who debuted in ! 996, it will not be very long before DO player will have entered the competition other 
than through the national draft. Note that Keating was delisted by Brisbane at the end of the 2006 season. 
58 For a discussion on the validity of salary caps see Davies. above n48 , and Buti, above nIl. 
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1. A faster game played by full time professional players who are fitter and 
more skillful than previous generations because of the extra time that they 
can devote to training. 
2. A more even and more interesting competition where the difference between 
the best and worse teams is far narrower than in the decades prior to the 
introduction of the draft 
3. The opportunity to still support a club that may have been traditional for a 
family to follow for generations, even if in the case of South Melbourne and 
Fitzroy supporters it involves following a team now based interstate. 
4. The near certainty that within a ten year period a team will enjoy some 
finals representation. 
5. More televised matches than ever before. 
It is therefore suggested that for the above reasons the AFL draft has not been 
injurious to the pubilc. This can also be illustrated by looking at the fact that in the 
era prior to the draft system and salary some teams went decades without making 
the finals. Hawthorn, for instance, ,vent 32 years without making the finals from 
1925-1956 while South Melbourne (now Sydney) went 24 years without making 
the finals during the period of 1946-1969. Otber long periods without making tbe 
finals include Melbourne's 22 years from 1965-86 and St. Kilda's 21 from 1940-
60.59 
Thus, after applying two elements of the Nordenfelt test, the author would argue 
that the AFL draft does operate in the interests of the league as it does help to 
achieve its stated objective of a more even competition, and that it is also not 
injurious to the public. This suggests that the question of reasonableness in regard 
to the AFL draft system is therefore dependent upon its impact on the players. 
The Interests of the Players 
The interests of the players wishing to play AFL is the opportunity to have a full 
time professional career with stable employment situations, which, ideally would 
also involve playing for the club of their choice. With the AFL draft system players 
59 Lovett, n57, 618. It is acknowledged that, percentage wise, more teams make the finals now than they did in some 
of these decades, but adjusting the figures to the present day 50 per cent of the teams making the finals does little to 
change these figures. Hawthorn record, for instance, would only be altered by a 5111 place in 1943, and hence would 
still have had a period of 18 years without making the finals, one year in the finals, followed by another period of 13 
years without making the finals. South Melbourne meanwhile would slill have gone l7 years without making the 
finals. 
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unquestionably have little or no choice in who w1l1 be their employer for the fIrst 
two years of their AFL career, and this, prima facie, certainly goes against the 
fundamental right of an employee to select their employer. "What the rules permits 
after this initial two period then needs to be examined to see whether they give 
players genuine bargaining power to then select the employer of their choice, for as 
was stated in Curro v Beyond Productions, 60 the relative bargaining position of the 
p31iies is an important consideration when determining reasonableness in regard to 
a restraint of trade. 
The first point that needs to be made in regard to the bargaining power of the AFL 
players is the presence of a strong players' association as 99.5 per cent of the 
players are members of the Australian Football League Players Association 
(AFLPA),61 with Smith62 suggesting that it has become a powerful lobby group. 
While the AFLP A did not playa part in the drawing up of the original draft rules, 
it certainly has sufficient clout to influence the ongoing operation of the draft, and 
because of the decision in Adamson, is able to negotiate from a position of strength 
with its governing body, the AFL Commission. 63 
What is more relevant in regard to players with at least two years experience in the 
AFL is their individual bargaining power in relatjon to the clubs. The author 
suggests that the interactive use of both a national and pre-season draft does give 
players already in the AFL some genuine bargaining power whenever they wish to 
move clubs, as a number of case studies over the last decade clearly illustrate. It is 
also suggested that it is this trade aspect of the AFL draft that is a major, and 
significant, difference between the AFL draft system and the NSWRL draft system 
as it enables players already in the competition to change clubs without being 
limited to just the internal pre-season draft. 
The Sydney Swans, for instance, after finishing last in 1994 with only four wins, 
had both second and third choice in the national draft at the end of that year. 
Fremantle, meanwhile, had the number one choice as part of its player package on 
entering the competition. Both these interstate clubs chose promising young 
Victorians with these picks, Fremant1e selecting Jeff White, Sydney, Anthony 
Rocca and Shannon Grant, both of whom expressed a strong desire to remain in 
Melbourne, though they eventually agreed to go to Sydney for the mandatory first 
two years . 
• 0 (1993) 30 NSWLR 337,345. 
61 Braham Dabscheck. 'Playing the Team Game: Unions in Australian Professional Team Sports' (1996) 38 Journal 
of Industrial Relations 600-628, 6 I 2. 
62 Patrick Smith 'League fast nmning out of credibility', The Australian, Thursday, 8 May, 2003, 16. 
63 For further discussion on the use and impact of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Australian team sport see 
Dabscheck and Opie, above n7. 
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At the end of that period Rocca indicated his desire to join his brother, Saverio, at 
Collingwood. Negotiations began between the two clubs, with Rocca indicating he 
would nominate for the intemal draft if no agreement was reached, even thougb 
there was no guarantee Collingwood would be able to select him. In such a 
scenario, however, Sydney would receive nothing for what had been a valuable 
early draft choice. An eleventh hour pre-national draft agreement was reached 
between Sydney and Collingwood, which saw Rocca move to Collingwood in 
exchange for two players and a draft pick.64 
Both White and Grant were to sign for another year with Fremantle and Sydney 
respectively, before indicating their wish to return to Victoria. Melbourne showed 
its interest in both players, and after finishing last that season it had the first 
selection in both the national and pre-season drafts. Fremantle, however, was able 
to negotiate a deal with Melbourne which saw it receive player and draft choices in 
return for White going to Melbourne. The incentive for Melbourne to do such a 
deal was that it then allowed it to retain its first round draft choke in the pre-
season draft. 65 
North Melbourne (now known as the Kangaroos) meanwhile was interested in 
obtaining the services of Grant who stated he was happy to go to e:ither Melbourne 
or North Melbourne. Negotiations began with Sydney, with North Melbourne at 
first offering Brett Allison, but Sydney was adamant that it would only accept 
disgruntled North Melbourne captain, Wayne Schwass, as a direct swap. Schwass 
was keen to leave North Melbourne after a very public verbal altercation with 
coach Denis Pagan after that year's Preliminary Final, and indicated that be was 
more than bappy to go to Sydney. North Melbourne, therefore, faced the real 
prospect of not only losing one of its best players, and gaining nothing in return, 
but also the likelihood of having Grant being selected by Melbourne, unless it 
could successfully negotiate a deal with Sydney. In the end North Melbourne 
relented and agreed to a direct swap with Sydney which saw both clubs obtain a 
replacement player for a player they were inevitably going to lose, while just as 
critically, the wishes of both players were also fulfilled. 66 
A similar situation involved the Brisbane Lions after it selected Western Australian 
youngster, Des Headland, with the first draft choice in 1998. Headland stayed for 
four years, including playing a staffing role in Brisbane's 2002 Premiership win. 
At the end of that season, with his contract completed, he indicated his wish to 
return to Western Australia, and eventually a deal was struck between Brisbane 
and Fremantle which saw Headland go Fremantle and Brisbane receive its first 
M Lovett, above n57, 389. 
0$ Ibid 375. 
66 Ibid 389. 
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round choice. 67 The 2002 draft also saw Nick Davis move from Collingwood to 
Sydney in exchange for Sydney's second round draft pick, a move seen as 
representing a much better deal for Sydney as Davis was considered to be worth a 
first round draft selection. Sydney, however, was unwilling to give up its first 
round selection as it wanted to select a mid-field player rather than a small forward 
like Davis. 68 However, once Davis made it clear that he no longer wished to 
remain at Collingwood and wanted to retllin to Sydney, Collingwood had little 
choice but to accept the second round draft selection. The only other altemative 
was to have a player on its list who no longer wished to be there, and as pointed 
out by Hill J in Adamson, this is something that clubs try to avoid as it is 
detrimental to team moral. 69 During the 2003 trade period on the other hand 
Collingwood was unable to negotiate a deal with Port Adelaide for star mid-fielder, 
Nick Stevens, who firstly turned down an offer to be traded to the Melbourne club, 
then simply nominated for the internal draft where he was subsequently selected by 
Carlton. 70 This was a perfectly acceptable outcome for Stevens as his main priority 
was to return to his home city of Melbourne, and he was just as happy to go to 
Carlton as he was to Collingwood. Collingwood on the other hand missed out on 
obtaining a valuable player while Port Adelaide received nothing in return for the 
departure of Stevens, and for jnstance would have received Melbourne's fifth pick 
in the draft had that deal been successful. 71 
These are examples, it is suggested, of what MacKinnon J discussed in Smith, 
namely that there is a real incentive for a club to obtain a deal that suits a player 
because under a draft system clubs need to make the most of their draft picks, and 
losing a player to another club and getting nothing in return means that the club has 
effectively lost a draft choice. 
It should also be noted that under the old NSWRL draft system all the players 
mentioned above could only have gone to another club via the internal draft, with 
no bargaining power to give them a say in where they would go. As a consequence 
they were back in the same position they were when they bad flIst wanted to join 
the league. It should also be noted that under the NSWRL draft system when a 
player nominated for the internal draft, the club involved also received nothing in 
return for what may well have been an early draft selection. 
It is suggested, therefore, that what these case studies indicate is that while players 
will have little or no choice under the AFL draft rules as to whom his first 
67 Chip Le Grand, 'Headland listens to heart, answer calJ of the west', 17Ie Weekend Australian, 15-16 Febmary, 
2003,50; Lovett, above n57, 362. 
68 'Who's in, who's out' The Age, Tuesday, 29 October 2002. Sport 3. 
69 Adamson and Others v New SOllih Wales Rughy League Ltd (md Others (Trial Case) (l990) 27 FeR 535,557. 
70 Lovett, above n57. 350. 
71 Chip Le Grand, 'Bulldogs ploy under :rITe', 17Ie Weekend Australian, 18 October, 2003,51 
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employer will be, this will only be the case for the fIrst two years. At the end of 
that period they can choose to stay with the club that drafted them, ask the club to 
trade them, or decide to re-nominate for the draft by means of the pre-season 
internal draft, and in this process players have sigillficant bargaining power which 
can help them to move to the club of their choice. Thus, the author would argue 
that the AFL rules do not impose the same post-contractual restriction on the 
players' selection of their employer which had been one of the reasons Wilcox J 
bad declared the NSWRL draft to be a restraint of trade. 
However, while these are examples of how the AFL draft rules can give a player 
who makes it clear that he wishes to leave a club sufficient bargaining power to 
achieve this objective, there are also examples where players have been linked to 
trade deals without their know ledge, or have been mentioned as possible trades 
while they are in the process of negotiating new contracts with their present clubs. 
For example, prior to the 1999 national draft Collingwood wished to secure the 
services of Richmond's Steve McKee to fin its perceived tall player needs. 
Richmond, meanwhile, were interested in securing a small rnidfielder in the mould 
of Collingwood's Clinton King. A pre-national draft deal was therefore struck 
between the two clubs which resulted in a direct swap of the two players. 72 The 
lateness of the deal, however, meant that Clinton K.ing did not know he would be 
going to a new club until the following morning, and even then it was from sources 
other than the two clubs involved. 
During the 2001 pre-draft trading period it was noted that Hawthorn's Trent Croad 
went into a post season operation a Hawk and came out a Docker, Hawthorn and 
Fremantle having negotiated a trade deal during the time of the operation. 73 st 
Kilda, meanwhile, having accepted it was going to lose Barry Hall, to Sydney, 
began to see what players it could target in a potential trade deal. Five players were 
mentioned in the media as possibilities, though Sydney insisted that none of these 
players would be traded. In the end anotber player not mentioned in the media 
reports, plus draft choices, were exchanged in a three way deal involving Sydney, 
St. Kilda and Richmond. 74 While it is accepted that St Kilda had the right to try 
and obtain the best possible trade deal for a star player, it was nevertheless an 
unsatisfactory situation to have so many Sydney players feeling uncertain about 
their futures 
When the 2005 trade period saw only 13 players change clubs, there were calls 
from those within the industry that the trade period was too regulated and that it 
n Lovett, above n57. 353. 
73 Chip Le Grand, 'Croad awakes a Docker', The Australian. Wednesday, 10 October, 2001,2 L 
7< 'For the record', The Auslralian. Wednesday, 10 October. 2001,20. 
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had become too restrictive to serve the needs of clubs and players. 75 Suggested 
changes from people like Chief Executive of the AFLPA, Brendan Gale, were for 
limited free agency for players who have played a certain number of games, and 
for clubs to be able to trade draft picks from more that one year. 76 
Suggested Changes to theAFL Draft 
As Le Grand points out the AFL trade period serves an essential purpose, allowing 
clubs to make immediate improvements to their playing list, while at the same time 
providing players with the opportunity to find employment at another club. 77 
While the author is also of the opinion that the trade period is an important 
component of the AFL' s draft system, the author is also of the opinion that there 
are a number of issues that need to be addressed. 
The first question is how the AFL should address the issue that, at ~resent, AFL 
clubs are able to trade p1ayers, initially at least, without their consent. 7 In regard to 
this question it is worth noting the eventual outcome of the Bosman decision in 
relation to European soccer. After the Bosman ruling saw the end of the transfer 
system for out of contract soccer players, a new set of Regulatlons for the transfer 
of players still under contract were made. One significant rule was that no player 
could be transferred without his consent, with penalties being imposed on any club 
who approached another club without the consent of the player concerned. 79 It is 
suggested that a sllnilar rule could easily be incorporated into the AFL draft system 
so that no player could be considered as part of trade deal without first obtaining 
his consent. This would mean that a player who indicated that he wished to leave 
club A to go to club B could only be exchanged for draft selections and players 
who had clearly indicated their wish to leave club B by, for instance, asking to be 
placed on some type of trade or transfer 11s1. This would mean, for example, that 
the Shannon Grant! Wayne Schwass swap would have been allowed to have taken 
place as both these out of contract players had indicated their willingness to leave 
75 O1ip Le Grand, 'Tough to kick a goal' The Weekend Australian, 8 October, 2005, 27. Note that in the 2006 draft 
r,eriod this number of players who were traded to a new club had dropped even further to just nine. 
6 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
n Under the rules a player, his dub and the prospective club must all agree to the tenns of the trade, but that does 
not stop clubs from agreeing frrstly willi another club to trade particular player to that club, and then consulting with 
that player to see if /hey wi!! be willing to go to that new club. It should also be kept in mind that a player under a 
contract can, by means of the principles of contract law, bold his club to that contract and so refuse a particular 
trade. 
79 Article 13 of the Regulations Governing the Application ofthe Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, 
http:lwww.fifa2.com. For a discussion of these new Regulations ,ee Chris Davies, 'Post Bosman and the Future of 
Soccer is Contract Law', (2003) 19 Journal o/Conrract Law 190·202. 
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their Oliginal club and go to North Melbourne and Sydney respectively. The deal, 
therefore, would have taken place with the full consent of both players. 
Undcr this proposal the Clinton King/Steve McKee deal, however, could not have 
taken place, at least not without the prior consent of the players concerned. In the 
case of Barry Hall, S1. Kilda w{mld have been restricted to negotiating draft 
choices with Sydney, or to players who had indicated their consent to be traded, 
not the Sydney players St. Kilda had indicated, via the media, that it was interested 
in as none had indicated any desire to leave Sydney. Obviously with relatively few 
draft choices each year, some considerable restriction is involved here, which is 
why it may be necessary to allow clubs to trade, not only present year draft picks, 
but possibly following years as welL 
It could also be possible to allow clubs to seek a trade involving players from other 
clubs who have indicated no desire to leave, but only if it obtains the permission of 
the player ftrst. For instance when St Kilda was interested in a munber of Sydney 
players as a trade for Barry Hall, it would have needed to have contacted the 
players concerned first, either through their managers, or perhaps through an AFL, 
or AFLP A, appointed 'draft officer' who could act as a neutral negotiator. The 
important thing would be that the players' consent is obtained before they are even 
discussed as being part of a trade deal. It is suggested that some players, although 
not initially interested in changing clubs, may be interested in an offer that, for 
instance, gives them a much better opportunity of playing in their favoured 
position. 
It should be noted that the AFLP A attempted in the recent enterprise bargaining 
agreement to have the trading of players limited to out of contract players, but 
ultimately it settled for the compromise that players on contracts longer than three 
years would not be traded in the first year of that contract. The AFLP A was 
successful however in ensuring that contracted players could no longer be 
delisted. 80 As mentioned, the author suggests that the implementation of a consent 
clause would still al10w clubs to trade contracted players, but it would be a much 
fairer system on the players. 
The author also agrees with those within the industry that the present rules are too 
restrictive and that the system can be made less rigid and still retain its integrity 
and its ultimate objective, namely achieving an even competition. 
The first way is the introduction of a limited free agency which, for instance, could 
allow players who have played 100-150 games, or who have played for at least six 
Ml Greg Denham, Michael Davis, 'Aging stars benefit in new award', The Australian, Tuesday, J 7 June, 2003, 17. 
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years, the opporttmity of moving from their club without needing to comply with 
the draft rules. The clubs involved would then have to negotiate an appropriate 
compensation package for the player's former club, and if the two clubs cannot 
agree on the value of a free agent, the suggestion is that an independent mediator 
could be appointed to settle such a dispute. 81 It should also be noted that free 
agency can also work well for the clubs, as has been illustrated in the NFL. This is 
because it can assist a club obtain a player that can immediately fill a weakness in 
the side and therefore poten6ally make the team immediately stronger, unlike the 
selection of young draft choices who may take a number of years to fulfill their 
potential. This is something that the AFLP A is presently researching, with the 
intention of making limited agency part of the next collective bargaining 
agreement that is scheduled to be completed prior to the 2008 season. 82 
The other way by which the trade aspect of the AFL draft could be made less 
restrictive is to allow clubs to trade draft cboices from more than one year, 
something that again is already allowed in the NFL As Le Grand points out this 
would in effect increase currency that the clubs have in regard to trading, which in 
tum would provide greater opportunities for players seeking to change clubs. Le 
Grand uses the example of Peter Everitt who wanted to leave Hawthorn at the end 
of the 2005 season due to personal problems with the club's coach and take up the 
offer of a three year contract with Sydney. Sydney, as reigning premiers, did not 
have good draft selections and were therefore not in the position to provide 
Hawthorn with an acceptable compensation package, so the deal did not eventuate. 
If Sydney had been able to trade future year draft choices as well, then the deal 
may have taken place. 83 Although this may also be seen as an example of the 
restrictions that are placed on players, it should also be acknowledged that Everitt 
had earlier in the year agreed to a one year extension to his contract. However, it 
should be further acknowledged that unlike most employees, Everitt was not able 
to leave his employer by giving one month's notice, though at the end of this 
81 Le Grand, above 075,27. 
82 Ibid. 
83 In this article's discussion of the trade deals that have taken place in Ihe last dec"de Of so in the AFL the Sydney 
Swans have figured prominently. This is not surprising considering that it has been the club that has been the most 
active in giving up early draft picks and players in order to secure players it had identified as being suitahle players. 
First, second or third round draft choices, for instance, were traded over the years in order to secure Jason Ball, Paul 
Williams, Barry Hall, Nick Davis and Darren Jolly to the club, all of whom played an important role in the Sydney's 
2005 premiership win. In the 2005 trade Sydney again traded away their first and second round draft choices in 
order to secure the services of Essendon's Ted Richards and Geelong's Paul Chambers, while in 2006 it traded a 
second round draft selection in return for Hawthorn's Peter Everitt Other clubs, most notably St Kilda and 
Geelong, have concentrated more on selecting young players, which indicates that different strategies can work for 
different clubs as SI. Kilda has made the final four in both 2004 and 2005, whlle Geelong figured prominently in tbe 
2005 finals. It also worth noting that the two Grand Finalists in 2005 and 2006, Sydney and the West Coast Eagles, 
had both made the finals nine times in the last eleven years, indicating that obtaining the very early draft pick.~ is not 
absolutely essential for success as both clubs have bad only two top ten draft choices during the last eleven years. 
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extension to the contract he was traded to Syduey in exchange for a second round 
draft selection in the 2006 draft. 
Conclusion 
The author firstly suggests that the decision in Adamson does not mean that all 
draft systems are going to be considered to be unreasonable restraints of trade by 
the courts, with the crucial factor being how restrictive a particular draft system is 
in regard to enabling players to find the employer of their choice. It is also 
suggested that in regard to the AFL draft, the Norden/elt test would suggest that it 
does operate in the interests of the league by helping to achieve its stated objective 
of a more even competition, and at the same time is not injurious to the public. 
The issue of whether or not it is a reasonable restraiut of trade therefore lies with 
its impact on the players. TIle author agrees with the statements made by 
MacKinnon] in Smith that the players are the direct recipients of the benefits of 
the draft because the more even competition it has helped to create means there is 
more money in the game and therefore ultimately better payments to the players. In 
this regard it can be deemed to be reasonable on the players, though there is still 
the question as to whether it is unreasonable in that it prevents the players from 
selecting their employer, a factor that was emphasised in Adamson. 
However, it should also be noted that the draft system at the centre of the Adamson 
case was far more restrictive on the players' movements than tbe AFL's, and yet it 
was held by the original trial judge in Adamson to be a reasonable restraint of 
trade. Statements made by the Full Court of the Federal Court in the subsequent 
appeal indicate that a different set of rules to those of the NSWRL could represent 
a reasonable restraint of trade. This then raises the question as to whether the AFL 
draft can be distinguished from the NSWRL draft. The author would suggest tbat 
the rules of the AFL draft can be so distinguished on the grounds that, firstly, it 
contains just the one external and one internal draft, rather than a number of 
internal draft meetings that were present in the NSWRL draft system. This, it is 
suggested, is much fairer on the players than the NSWRL system had been as it 
allows them to know which club they will be playing for at a much earlier date. 
The second reason is that under the NSWRL draft, players aheady in the 
competition could only change clubs by means of the internal draft. This meant 
that under the NSWRL draft the players had no more bargaining power than when 
they first entered the competition. However, under the AFL draft, unlike the 
NSWRL draft, players who have been in the competition for at least two years and 
have come to the end of their contracts, arguably have some genuine bargaining 
power. As the case studies show, the operation of the AFL draft rules has enabled 
players to move to the club of their choice. The AFL draft rules certainly prevent 
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players coming into the competltlOn for the first time to be able select their 
employer, but the author suggests that it is not unreasonable for an untried 
youngster to have to go to the club that selects him for the first two years, given 
that the AFL has created a system that provides these players with a genuine 
professional career in a competition where the average annual wage is now over 
$200,000. 84 
What could be considered unreasonable, however, is that the present AFL draft 
mles allow players already in the competition to be traded, initially at least, 
without their consent, though this can remedied by the inclusion of a consent 
clause. While the author accepts comments made from those within the industry 
that the trade period is restrictive on the players, it should also be noted that it is no 
where near as restrictive as not having any trade period, as occurred in the NSWRL 
draft. The restrictive nature of the draft on the players, however, could be further 
reduced by the introduction of a limited free agency, and allowing clubs to trade 
draft choices from more than one year. 
If the NRL, as has been suggested at various times, decides to bring in a new draft 
system it would, for obvious legal reasons, have to be significantly different to that 
which was implemented in 1990. It is suggested that the AFL draft system would 
be a good model to follow, namely that there should be a national (external) and 
pre-season (internal) draft so that players already in the competition, who wish to 
leave a club, could be traded for either draft choices or other players. It is also 
suggested that a consent clause in relation to players who are the targets of 
potential trades, limited free agency and the flexibility to trade choices from more 
than one year would provide a draft system that is even more reasonable on the 
players than the present AFL model. This would not only make it less likely that 
players would take legal action, but also that if they did choose to do so, more 
likely that the system would survive such a restraint of trade challenge in court. 
84 Le Grand, above n75, 27. 
